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and

"Politics and the

on

Constitution'

,

establish
we

meeting

with alumni of

recent
years, "Has Professor Crosskey
his
book?"
we have
And
completed
grown to expect the
smile of friendly doubt as to whether he would ever
finish, which has always followed our enforced answer:

yet." Well,

at

territory of the several states, but
activity among the people of

nomic

For many years back, we of the Faculty have known
had inevitably to face the question, whenever

"Not
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premacy
kinds of

national,

a

single

over

all

supreme

court

state courts

law, whether
in character.

to

regulate

all

eco

the states; and to
for the country, with su

in their administration of all

written

or

unwritten,

Only through

a

or

state or

process of distor-

last, this book, long eagerly awaited

"This remarkable work sweeps away acres of
that have been written about the Con

nonsense

stitution, and argues with an amplitude of evi
dence that the framers of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights believed they were setting up a
national government, with the

thoroughly
cast

in

minor role. Professor

states

goes far
that the Federal Convention in

a

toward

Crosskey

proving
Congress with general (not enu
national
merated)
legislative authority and to
tended

to vest

confer upon the federal courts a unified national
administration of justice. He also shows how and

William W. Cross key

why the original meaning has become obscured
and distorted. His book should be in the hands
of all students of the Constitution, whether
ju
rists, lawyers, historians or poli.tical scientists. It

tion, which set in at an early date, was the meaning of
the Constitution perverted to what Americans have come

is

the

to

fertile commentary on that
document since The Federalist papers of Madi
son, Hamilton and Jay."

perhaps

believe it

means.

It all sounds incredible.

most

undertakes

Yet, when Professor Crosskey

prove that such were, indeed, the historical
he
means
facts,
proof in the sense of judicial proof, the
kind of proof that will stand up in a court of law, that
to

will be admitted
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apt

to

to

be

convince them

presented to the jury, and
beyond a reasonable doubt.

that is
To be

which occurred a hundred-and-sixty-odd
years ago
easily be proved today with absolute
in
all
exactitude,
cases; especially when they consist in the
sure,

events

cannot

by

Mr.

Crosskey's students, friends, and colleagues,
appear: it will be published by the University
Chicago Press on April 17.
about

to

As those of

just

one

ending

more

flood

of those

us

who have read it

know, this book

among the many poured
writers and publishers; it

by

works whose.

publication

is

out

in

a

is

is

of

not

never

is, instead,

one

intellectual
that
the Con
prove
stitution of the United States and much,
especially of the
earlier part, of American constitutional history are mis
understood; that the "real" Constitution, as it was con
ceived by the Founding Fathers, has little
similarity to
that described by the theories of the
Court, un
event.

rare

Mr.

Crosskey

undertakes

der which the country has

long

an

to

Supreme
operating.

been

According to Crosskey, it was the intention of the
Fathers-subject to all the limitations upon particular
matters that the Constitution contains-to set
up a na
tional government of general powers,
legislative, execu
tive, and judicial; in particular, it was their intention to

make clear that thi.s government would have
power,
only to regulate the commerce moving between

not

territory

thought-processes
has been

of

presented,

men.

But the evidence that exists

and it is

points overwhelming,
the sagacity with which

not

it

impressive array, in
its sheer mass, but by
discovered and the skill

an

only by
was

with which it is

presented.
Professor Crosskey has gone to the sources, all the
sources of which he
could possibly think as likely to
throw light upon the ideas of the men of 1787 and the
product of their deliberations. Of course he has not found
everything; but I venture to think it will be a hard task,
indeed, to discover any letter, diary entry, newspaper
article, pamphlet, or other relevant record of the time
which, if still available, Mr. Cross key has not unearthed,
analyzed, and evaluated, in its historical context, as it
bears upon his subject. No wonder, then, that it has taken
him so many years to complete these volumes.
Those of us who have known Bill Crosskey
during the

last fifteen years know what an amount of work and
effort have gone into this work, how
many wakeful
nights have been involved, how many hours of poring

The
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over

University of Chicago

the files of

trips

many
sions of

to

yellowed newspapers of bygone days, how
the libraries of the East, how many revi

already drafted, and how many arguments
colleagues. We also witnessed the periods
of doubt and disgust, which, however, he always in the
end overcame through scholarly persistence.
text

with friends and

Now the volumes
its

are

before

us,

and

we can

follow in

completeness the argument and. the evidence.
The fact which is presented as standing out

principal
is the

cause

nonuser

of

by

the

the federal government of

those broad powers which were granted to it by the
Constitution. The radical change of the country's political
climate that occurred almost

immediately after the estab
government placed the constitutional
in
the
hands
of men who not only did not wish to
powers
use them but were
vitally interested in making their use
for
the
future. The driving force in trans
impossible
the
of the thirteen states into a na
Confederation
forming
lishment of the

new

tion came, it will be remembered, from those who formed
themselves into the Federalist party after the new govern
ment began to function. The
principal strength of this
group had lain from the

beginning
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mands. Twelve years after the establishment of the new
government it was in the hands of those who were trying
to reduce its powers to the minimum level
by construc

tion; and

kept in the hands of such men, almost
continuously, during the entire period up to the Civil
War. During that long period, whatever governing there
was, was done by the states; the powers of the nation un
it

was

der the Constitution
as

the transformation of the Constitution

for decades

Law School

in the northern states,

where the powerful commercial
interested
in
groups
establishing one national gov
ernment that could do
away with the barriers by which
the several states had begun to impede internal trade and
which could act for the nation as a whole in its commer

especially Massachusetts,
were

were not

And after 1812 the

used.

group dominated the

Supreme
Story were lone nationalists on a
Court overwhelmingly opposed to their ideas. Marshall
fought rear-guard actions, trying to preserve of the orig
inal design of the Constitution as much as could be saved
for a possibly different future, for tactical reasons going
along with his colleagues of the Court's majority and
even
writing opinions in support of their views. In this
view, he thus appears as anything but the bold innovator
by whose inventive genius originally narrow federal
same

Court. Marshall and

powers were broadened at the expense of the states.
The total view of constitutional history, as it appears in
Mr. Crosskey's work, is even more startling. The picture

that arises from the immense
is that of

body

of American

historiog

federal nation in which the powers
raphy
of the central government have been kept from the outset
within narrow limits, so narrow, indeed, that they had to
be broadened by creative and not always ingenious inter

pretati.ons,
more

a

in the

so, in the

period of the Marshall Court, and much
period since the 1880's, when the scope of

cial, financial, and political relationships with foreign
countries. It was by a fortunate coincidence that, for a
short, but decisive period, these northern interests hap

governmental functions of the federal government was
continuously increased to the dramatic climax of the New
Deal and the Washington "centralizers" of the Fair

pened to coincide with southern fears that the future de
velopment of the western lands of the South might be
threatened by foreign powers, especially Spain, and that
no effective
military defense against such threats would
be possible for the South alone. It was this temporary
coincidence of interests that produced the Constitution.
The ends of neither North nor South, as they were at
that time, would have been served by a federal govern
ment so impotent as it was later made to
appear by the
proponents of the theory of states rights.
This theory and the concomitant notion that the fed
eral government, as established by the Constitution, was
one merely of a few enumerated
powers was invented
when a shift in the economic and political situation

Deal.

the temporary southern fervor for a strong
national government. The outbreak of revolution in
France and the consequent successful slave rebellion in
the island of Haiti filled southern slaveowners with

dampened

alarming fears, not only for the economic bases of their
existence, but for the very lives of themselves and their
families.

Every step in this process was contested in the
Supreme Court, which thus was thrust into the role of
the final arbiter in

problems not so much of law as of
policy, and which sanctioned this steady expansion
either by resorting to sophistry or in treating the Consti
tution as a "living document," the choice of the term
depending upon the observer's own leanings. In the view
of American history that Mr. Cross key takes, this tradi
basic

tional view is wrong. Conceived at the outset as a grant
of all powers necessary for the vigorous government of a
unified nation, the Constitution was by sophistry nar
rowed down

successful

to a mere

shadow of its

original self;

and

so

this process that the knowledge of the
Constitution's original and true meaning was lost com

pletely;

was

and when the need for national

governmental

action became

imperative after the Civil War, the bases
for it could barely be found in the Constitution. It thus
had to be squeezed and stretched in the most artificial
ways to produce that ill-fitting patchwork of powers
where intricacies have

so

often stood in the way of effec

Simultaneously, the new prosperity which had
begun to succeed the depression of the post-Revolution
years, together with those rural resentments against urban
financiers to which the Jeffersonians appealed success
fully, had come to weaken the influence of the commer

governmental action, which has resulted in so many
baffling uncertainties, hardships, and injustices, and which
would all be unnecessary if the Constitution were only
understood in its original meaning. Most of our tradi
tional constitutional law has accordingly been wrong,

cial groups of the North and the urgency of their de-

(Continued on page 14)
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which has been

(Continued from page 7)

historiography mistaken, because both
have unquestioningly accepted the falsification of the
meaning of the Constitution which was brought about by
the Jeffersonians for political ends and was gradually
foisted onto the country as correct by them and their
states-rights successors in the period before the Civil War.
These startling theses are sought to be proved by Pro
fessor Crosskey along two lines: a study of the Constitu
tion as a meaningful document, and a study of the facts of
American constitutional history. What, he asks, were the
real issues, demands, and aspirations at the time of the
Revolution? What were the problems developed during
the period of Confederation? What did actually occur at
and

our

traditional

the Federal Convention? What
tactics of the

struggle
political sphere in

were

the issues and the

for ratification? What

happened

in

early years of government un
der the Constitution? How did the enemies of unified
government produce their new theories about the mean
the

ing of the

the

Constitution and

by

what

them for the

ceed in

did

they suc
original meaning in
means

substituting
public mind so as finally to establish them
unquestionably accepted meaning?
These broad questions are not fully discussed
the

the

as

in the

granted
problematical
was

guage

we

which
be of

turns out to

cannot, and much
we

special significance,

wrote

in

Of

ours.

of their

vocabulary. Most of the words
belong to ours, and mostly they
connotations of

been

meaning; but

not

first in nuances, then in

James Madison, whose

us.

notes on

the Federal Convention

an absolutely accurate
generally been accepted
with
which
they deal. Published
report of the proceedings
event
and nearly as long
more than fifty years after the

have

as

after Madison's transformation from
into

a

an

leading states-rights protagonist,

have been treated with
when

suspicion,

as,

ardent Federalist

these

notes

should

indeed, they

were

hints

they first appeared. Professor Crosskey
by him that indicates that such

evidence unearthed

picions
But,

were
as

not

line of

proof,

than the

sus

shifts,

us

now, Mr.

which is

Crosskey
basically that of

two

pursues his other

the

lawyer,

historian, although the latter's tools

are

rather
consis

of the former's tasks.

in the

performance
legal document. So, let us read it
this
is Mr. Crosskey's new propo
but-and
as
lawyers,
sal-not with the mind of a lawyer of the twentieth cen

tently employed

The Constitution is

a

the late nineteenth century, but with the mind of
lawyer of the late eighteenth century when
the document was drawn. That suggestion, it turns out,
cannot be followed easily. The ways of legal thought of

tury
an

or

American

contemporaries of Blackstone and Mansfield were
precisely those of today. Their methods of draftsman
ship were different; the political and legal universe within
which they lived, strove, worked, and wrote was theirs,
the

not

not ours.

They

had

problems

to

solve the very existence of

they thought,
the English

was

still

vocabulary
the

preserved
entirely. There
a more

same

have

massive way,

an

essential element in

the present part of Mr. Crosskey's work, and, when
read against the background of the old forgotten legal

eighteenth-century vocabulary,

an

the

Constitution emerges as a new document, simple, plain,
and consistent in all its parts, the carefully considered

and well-formulated work of
of

a

men

who

cannot

have

establish the government
anything
all
endowed
with
the powers necessary for
nation

other than

meant

to

effective government; for, when the document is so read,
it cannot be denied that the framers did succeed in ex
their scheme in clear

pressing

to

Commerce

to

read it in their way

read the Constitution in the

usage, Mr.

eighteenth-century

Clause; with the

under

language, plainly

standable to everyone who cares
rather than in that of later times.
In his endeavor

is for the future. In the

of lan

occurring so slowly, so imperceptibly, that they have
escaped complete discovery, even by lexicographers, who,
with all their meticulous effort, have been unable to
record and articulate all the shifts of all the meanings of
all the words of the language. Furthermore, basic ideas
have shifted in the legal realm; for example, as to the
status, makeup, and concrete content of the Common
Law; and since Mr. Crosskey shows that the framers
regarded the Common Law as being the standing nation
allaw, these shifts in legalideas have an important bear
ing on what the Constitution means.
The systematic investigation of the eighteenth-century
legal world and of the vocabulary of the American Con

unwarranted.

indicated, all this

volumes before

at

use

but

ideas and with

before

their

have

parts Professor Cross key will also show the decisive role
played in the falsification of the historical picture by

now

them

of the 1780's rather than that of later times, and that
English had its own usages, in structure as well as in

stitution makers of that time is

volumes

things

to

Besides, and this

course,

but it

English,

The full discussion has been
of
future
the
for
reserved
work, of which no more
parts
is
foretaste
than a tempting
given now. In these future
two

appeared

take for settled.

different from

discussed, and

could take many

forgotten; they

which

for

Crosskey starts
power of Congress

light

of

with the
to

"regu

late Commerce among the several States." It is taken as
axiomatic today that these words refer to what has come
to

be

known,

more

generally,

as

i.e., activities which involve the

"interstate

commerce";

of

goods, per
point in one state to a point in
another. If the clause were literally applied with that
meaning, much present-day legislation would be consti
tutional only within a most narrowly limited field, if at
all. To maintain the constitutionality of the federal anti
trust laws, labor laws, social security legislation, agricul
tural marketing laws, etc., it has therefore been necessary
to stretch the supposed constitutional grant of power so as
sons,

or

intelligence

extend

to

and then

to

although

the

to

from

activities apt

stretch this
text

movement

a

to

"affect interstate commerce,"

concept to its utmost limits,
of the Constitution, when read in the
new

The
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traditional way, contains nothing which would seem to
allow of even the first step in this stretching. But, strange
ly, there is no evidence that this usual reading was that
of the framers

of the Constitu

the

Law School

University of Chicago

other legal document, first to lay down a broad,
and then to state those of its specific applica
rule,
general
nance,

or

tions for which there existed

be

early expounders
phrase must have conveyed a dif
ferent meaning becomes clear when the late-eighteenth
century usage of the three keywords, "Commerce," "reg
ulate," and "States," is investigated. Mr. Crosskey finds
that "Commerce" meant not only buying and selling
goods and transportation but all gainful activity of every
kind. The verb "regulate" was synonymous with "gov
ern." So, "to regulate commerce" simply meant to take
all possible governmental measures in the economic
sphere. And, as for "among the States," the key to its
meaning is that "State," to the eighteenth-century mind,
was a "noun of multitude,"
meaning "the people" who
made up the "state"; a noun, in other words, comparable
to "tribes" and "nations." And a power "to regulate

they
single,

Commerce among the several States" of America is
therefore like a power "to regulate marriage among the

the other

tion. That

to

or

them the

Indian nation. Would anyone un
derstand such a power as limited to the regulation of in
tertribal marriages? Hardly; the natural meaning would
several tribes" of

be power

belong
merce

to

some

regulate marriage

as

the Indian tribes. In

to

to

just

all those persons who
same sense "com

the

among the several States" meant,

to

the

man

of the

among the
eighteenth century,
of
our American states, all these
people, wherever
people
be
with
to
relation
state lines. "The power to
they might
the
several States" is, then, the
regulate Commerce among
power to regulate the internal economic life of the nation,
just as the power to regulate commerce with foreign na
commerce

tions is that of

governing the

with the world

tionships

carried

on

nation in its economic rela

outside, and both together,

in

conjunction with that referring to the commerce with the
Indian tribes, constitute the fulness of governmental
power

deal with the economic life of the nation, in
and externally. The need for a government hav

to

ternally

ing just such
have been

power is then

shown, by

the

Mr. Cross key,

to

paved the way
for the Federal Convention, who composed the document
in it, and who hailed it after its adoption, just as it was
the butt of those who, early thereafter, began to attack
the Constitution as having gone too far for their tastes.
For all these propositions Professor Crosskey adduces
ample and convincing evidence. But, still, there remains a
source of doubt. If,
by the commerce clause, the federal
government was given the fulness of power in the eco
nomic field, why is it then followed by that catalogue of
special economic powers which we find in Section 8 of

emphasized by

men

who

the First Article of the Constitution: the powers to coin
regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin,
and fix the standard of weights and measures; or the
money,

power

establish post offices and post roads, etc? This
contradiction is explained when we consider two

to

seeming
first,

facts:

that it

was

no

eenth-century draftsman,

in

unusual
a

thing

contract,

will,

for

an

eight

statute, ordi-
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spelled

some

common,

particular

that

reason

Mr. Cross key shows

explicitly.
particular reason did,

out

in

a

exist for

fact,

the enumeration in Article 1, Section 8, of more than half
the specific commercial and other governmental powers

there enumerated:

they were enumerated to make sure
they belonged Congress rather than the President.
In eighteenth-century England the powers in question
had either been recognized as belonging to the Executive,
or had been the
subject of controversy between king and
Parliament. The history of these powers and controversies
is traced by Mr. Crosskey with meticulous care, just as he
points out the reasons why it was necessary for the
that

to

Fathers of the Constitution of the United States
that

expressly
gress

was to

they

to

were

belong

to state

Congress, it

to

Con

have them rather than the President. As for

specifically

enumerated powers of

Congress,

shows the miscellaneous motives that led

Mr.

the
Crosskey
mention
of
all
of
and
that
these
motives
these,
specific
had nothing to do with securing power against the states.
Nothing in the text of Section 8, Article I, indicates that
it

intended

was ever

to

to

draw the line between the powers

of the federal government and those of the states. The
clause says that: "The Congress" shall have certain pow
ers,

i.e., those which it specifically enumerates, and, then,

in its final

clause, also the

power "to make all laws which

shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
...

government of the United States, or in any department or
officer thereof." This is a plain reference to powers, be it

noted, that

are

vested

special department

the Constitution,

by

the government as
there any such powers? There

some

powers vested in the

are

President, the Senate, the Congress,
where

in

not

officer of the United States, but in
such. Where in the Constitution are

or

or

the

judiciary,

but

there any powers vested in the government as
such? So what is the meaning of this reference to the
are

"other Powers" of "the Government," in Section 8 of
Article I?
Orthodox constitutional
to
to

interpretation

has

no

answer

this question. It has consistently ignored this reference
the "other" powers vested in the government of the

United States. But,
instrument

which,

are we

as

Mr.

allowed

to

Crosskey

ignore
proves,

words in
was

an

drafted

with great care by experienced draftsmen? Certainly not
unless no reference for these words can be found any

where in the instrument. But such reference can be
found; to wit, in the Preamble, which to an eighteenth

lawyer

century

meant

more

devoid of direct

policies
eenth-century
was an
sense

and,
of

than

a

statement

mere

legal significance.

statute, treaty,

or

In

ordinance the

of

eight
preamble
an

essential part, often the most essential, not in the
simply guiding the judge in his interpretation

of

even

less,

in any-at that time-unknown

constitutionality,

but

as

the

expression

scrutiny

of those basic
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general principles which, stated bindingly in the most
conspicuous place, were to be spelled out as to detail,
where necessary, in the following parts of the instrument.
When scrutinized in this light, it appears that the Pre
amble to the Constitution is a most carefully phrased
statement of the purposes of government, as they had
been analyzed by the writers of the age and which, when
brought together, as they were in the Preamble, would
refer to the fulness of powers of sovereign government.
Still, the doubter may ask, what about the Tenth
Amendment? If the Constitution itself has failed with
to state that the federal government was
of enumerated powers, has that thought not
found expression in the Amendment? Again we are ad

sufficient
be

to

clarity

one

monished

of

a

of

a

by

Mr. Cross key

to

read it,

with the mind

not

citizen of the twentieth century, but with the mind
contemporary of the men of 1789, and again it ap

pears that the

does,

text

supports, Mr.

strongly

only not militate against, but
Crosskey's reading of the Consti
not

tution.

And so, taking up
part of the instrument after the
author
demonstrates, with infinite care, pains,
other, the
one

and

patience,

that

they

all make

sense

and fit

together

to

make up a plain, simple, and efficient governmental
scheme, in which the states were not to be obliterated but
continue

were to

role in the

to

function and

governmental

to

structure

important
occupy
of the country, but a
an

be

scheme, nevertheless, under which this country
a nation, one and indivisible, and in which the national
was to

government was to be able to act in reference to all mat
ters for which uniform regulation and uniform action

should

any time be deemed advisable

at

That

so

political

shortly

after the

constellation

was

adoption
to

or

necessary.

of the Constitution

a

arise which would render

the exercise of these powers impossible could not be fore
seen by its makers. Still less could they foresee that the

meaning of their work was to be intentionally distorted
by some of those who were in their very midst, and least
of all could they foresee that the latter's efforts would be
successfully carried on for a period long enough to allow
the original meaning of the Constitution to be forgotten
and to disappear behind the imperceptibly changed fa
cade of new word meanings and new basic conceptions
about the

common

law. For those doubters who find it

believe in the fact of actual, intentional distor
tion of the Constitution, Mr. Crosskey produces irrefuta

hard
ble

to

evidence; for example, with respect

post-facto
For

to

the

two

have

to

ex

clauses of the Constitution.

some

of his

background

material

we

wait

for the future parts of Mr. Cross key's work. But what he
has presented in the two volumes of Politics and the Con
stitution in the

History of

the United States is

impressive

enough.
That the book will be attacked is certain. Its theses are
startling not to provoke resistance on the part of his

Mr.

Crosskey's charge

of uncritical and thus

unscholarly

historical truth, of a partisan view skilfully
acceptance,
circumstances favorable to its adoption
under
propagated
as

almost

beyond

belief.

F or the constitutional life of the

Professor

Crosskey's reading

nation, the adoption of

of the basic

would

text

mean

unnecessary ballast those tortured
theories which constitutional lawyers found themselves

that

shake off

we

as

compelled to invent if government
tary twentieth-century needs. There
those doctrines which have

been used

tity

which

are

to

fulfil elemen

would also

often and

disappear
effectively

so

sectional groups to maintain the sacrosanc
arid interests. Certainly those interests

by

of their

so

was

tenets

still felt with

vigor

would find the

means

for

effective defense under any constitutional scheme. Yet, stiff
resistance must be expected against the acceptance of Mr.
Crosskey's thesis even as historically true. Assuming they
were to be
accepted as such, it might still be a long way
toward their full actualization in constitutional life. A cen

tury and a half of error produce the normative effect of
the factual. Yet, the meaning which the Founding Fathers
meant to

tirely.

express in their work

It will

cannot

be brushed aside

en

weapon in

political argu
powerful
to in dissenting opinions of the
it is bound to find, though probably,

serve as a

ment, it will be resorted

Supreme Court, and
at first, only in scattered instances, expression
of the Court. The readiness of the Court

in decisions

to resort to

histor

of the Constitution and

ical research in its

interpretation
legislation has been demonstrated by the use
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